AFTER BTL: HAVE BELIZE'S UNIONS AWAKENED? From Stopping an $80 Million Acquisition to a 90-Day Challenge Against the Way Public Institutions Are Governed

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Wed, 08/19/2026 - 08:26

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From Stopping an $80 Million Acquisition to a 90-Day Challenge Against the Way Public Institutions Are Governed

Belize City: Wednesday 19th August 2026

Something changed in Belize on August 18.

The thousands of feet expected on the streets did not arrive.
The placards prepared for another confrontation over BTL's proposed acquisition of Speednet did not become the day's defining image.
The demonstration was cancelled.
But the pressure was not.

Instead, organized labour walked into a press conference with something potentially more consequential than a protest:

A LIST OF DEMANDS.

The BTL–Speednet acquisition had already been rejected by Cabinet.

The immediate battle had therefore been won by those opposing the transaction.

The easiest thing for the unions to have done was declare victory, congratulate themselves and return to their individual industrial concerns.

They did not.

Instead, the National Trade Union Congress of Belize and its affiliates effectively said:

STOPPING THE DEAL IS NOT ENOUGH.

Their argument now appears to be that Belize must confront the institutional weaknesses that allowed such a controversial proposal to travel so far before public resistance forced a reckoning.

That changes the story completely.

FROM REACTION TO REFORM?

NTUCB President Ella Waight has established two clocks.

The first says:

IMMEDIATELY.

The second says:

90 DAYS.

The immediate demand concerns leadership at Belize Telemedia Limited.

The 90-day timetable concerns something substantially larger:

the architecture through which BTL and other public institutions are governed.

NTUCB has called for the immediate removal of BTL Chairman Markhelm Lizarraga, saying it has lost confidence in his leadership and alleging insufficient transparency and openness throughout the controversy.

It has also identified other BTL directors whose roles it believes should be reviewed.

Those are serious demands.

But National Perspective Belize must make an important distinction.

A union vote of no confidence is not itself proof of misconduct.
Disagreement with an acquisition is not automatically grounds for dismissal.
And unsuccessful corporate judgment is not necessarily corruption.
The unions therefore carry a burden of their own:

If removal is demanded, establish the governance grounds upon which removal is justified.

That is accountability.

Anything less risks becoming punishment for disagreement.

FIRST: CLOSE THE ACQUISITION PROPERLY

One NTUCB demand is particularly difficult to quarrel with.

The Congress wants any remaining BTL Board resolutions, approvals or corporate procedures associated with the Speednet acquisition formally concluded and the public informed.

That is important.

Cabinet rejected the acquisition.
But BTL's Board had previously approved proceeding.
The Chairman subsequently informed employees that the transaction was off.
Those developments strongly indicate political and corporate abandonment of the acquisition.

But institutional governance should not operate on inference.

If a Board resolution authorized the acquisition process, the public deserves to know whether that authorization has formally been rescinded, superseded or otherwise terminated.

The objective should be simple:

CLOSE THE FILE PROPERLY.

Not politically.
Not verbally.
Corporately.
And publicly.

THEN THE UNIONS WENT MUCH FURTHER

NTUCB wants BTL's governance structure changed.

The proposal is for a tripartite arrangement incorporating Government, labour and business representation.

The argument is straightforward:

If BTL belongs substantially to the Belizean people, those people should have meaningful representation within its governance.
That proposition deserves serious consideration.
But it also deserves scrutiny.

BTL is simultaneously a public-interest enterprise and a commercial corporation operating in an extraordinarily fast-moving technological industry.

Its Board must therefore satisfy two requirements that sometimes collide:

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

and

COMMERCIAL COMPETENCE.

Putting representatives around a table does not automatically guarantee either.

Belize must therefore ask:

Who selects those representatives?
What qualifications must they possess?
Whom do they legally represent once appointed?
Are they delegates instructed by their organizations?

Or directors with fiduciary obligations to the company and all shareholders?

How are conflicts of interest managed?
How are they removed?
How is performance measured?

Those details will determine whether tripartism strengthens BTL—or merely redistributes political influence around its Board table.

THE PUC PROPOSAL IS EVEN BIGGER

The unions are also proposing fundamental changes to the Public Utilities Commission.

NTUCB wants four of seven commissioners nominated through recognized Social Partners—labour, business, NGOs and churches—with three coming from Government.

The objective is understandable.

A regulator must not merely be independent.

IT MUST BE SEEN TO BE INDEPENDENT.

But replacing Government dominance with Social Partner dominance does not automatically produce regulatory independence.

That deserves reflection.

The PUC regulates interests affecting virtually every Belizean household and business.

Its commissioners should therefore possess technical competence, independence, security from political retaliation, strong conflict-of-interest rules and transparent appointment procedures.

The question should not simply be:

Who gets the four seats?

The better question is:

WHAT APPOINTMENT SYSTEM MAKES THOSE SEVEN PEOPLE MOST DIFFICULT FOR ANY GOVERNMENT, CORPORATION OR INTEREST GROUP TO CONTROL?

That should become the national objective.

THEN COMES A CONTRADICTION THE UNIONS THEMSELVES MUST ANSWER

NTUCB wants Government telecommunications business, statutory-board contracts and public-sector communications services directed to BTL.

Its argument is that public money should support a publicly owned national enterprise rather than subsidize private corporate profits.
The union has described that position as non-negotiable.
There is an understandable nationalist economic principle behind that position.

But there is also a contradiction.

The same movement that fought to preserve telecommunications competition is now proposing that one of the largest customers in Belize—

THE GOVERNMENT— should effectively guarantee its telecommunications business to one provider.

National Perspective must ask:

What happens to competitive procurement?

Suppose another provider offers Government better service at substantially lower cost.

Should taxpayers pay more because BTL is publicly owned?
Or should BTL, precisely because Belizeans own it, be capable of winning Government business competitively?

There may be legitimate circumstances in which national-security, infrastructure-sovereignty or strategic considerations justify preferential use of a national provider.

But a blanket 100-percent rule requires considerably more analysis.

Because:

DEFENDING BTL AND DEFENDING COMPETITION CANNOT BECOME CONTRADICTORY PRINCIPLES DEPENDING UPON WHO BENEFITS.

The same standards must apply to everyone.

THE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS HAVE NOW TURNED TOWARD THEIR OWN BOARD

The Belize Communications Workers Union has gone further.

It praised Allan Pollard and Anisa Perdomo for opposing the acquisition while issuing votes of no confidence against other directors.

Among those criticized was Eric Eusey, the representative of small shareholders.

BCWU alleges that small shareholders were not adequately consulted before he supported the acquisition.

That raises a legitimate governance question far larger than one director:

WHAT DOES REPRESENTATION ACTUALLY MEAN?

If somebody occupies a Board position specifically representing small shareholders, what mechanism exists for those shareholders to communicate their position?

Is consultation discretionary?
Is it mandatory?
Does the director exercise independent judgment?
And what mechanism allows the constituency to replace a representative in whom it has lost confidence?

Those questions should be answered institutionally rather than personally.

AND THEN THE PRESS CONFERENCE ESCAPED BTL

This may have been the most significant development of all.

The discussion expanded.

Union Senator Glenfield Dennison returned to controversies surrounding Ministry of Defence procurement and SmartStream disclosures and called upon public officers to report suspected wrongdoing.

He also publicly called for the resignation of Cabinet Secretary Stuart Leslie.

Those statements represent the Senator's allegations and political demands; they should not be confused with findings by a court, audit or independent investigation.

But their political significance is unmistakable.

The unions are no longer concentrating exclusively upon BTL.

They are expanding their argument toward:

public procurement;
government accountability;
institutional integrity;
legislative reform;
oversight bodies;
and public-sector governance.

The BTL controversy has become a doorway into something considerably larger.

THE CONTRACTOR GENERAL, AUDITOR GENERAL AND LEGISLATION ARE NOW INSIDE THE ARGUMENT

Senator Dennison raised legislative reforms which he argues could strengthen transparency and accountability.

The Public Service Union subsequently criticized aspects of Government's good-governance performance and raised concerns involving oversight institutions.

And then the teachers entered with their own demands.

This is where Government should pay very close attention.

Because separate grievances are beginning to occupy the same political room.

Telecommunications.
Procurement.
Oversight.
Education.
Public-service accountability.
Institutional appointments.
Transparency.

These issues may have different causes.

But once citizens begin interpreting them through one common narrative—

“THE SYSTEM IS NOT LISTENING”—

the political consequences can become much larger than any individual controversy.

THE GREEN MACHINE HAS ITS OWN CLOCK

BNTU President Nadia Caliz introduced another dimension.

Teachers have their own longstanding concerns.

And according to the reporting surrounding the August 18 press conference, BNTU indicated that it is not necessarily prepared to wait through NTUCB's entire 90-day timetable.

The warning is therefore important.

The labour movement may be standing together politically while individual unions continue carrying separate sectoral grievances.

That creates both strength and danger.

Strength because grievances can reinforce one another.
Danger because an agenda that becomes too broad can lose coherence.

A movement capable of explaining five achievable reforms can build public understanding.
A movement presenting twenty unrelated grievances can eventually become difficult for the public to follow.

The unions therefore face a strategic decision:

IS THIS A LIST OF COMPLAINTS—OR A PROGRAMME FOR REFORM?

Those are not the same thing.

SOMETHING HAS AWAKENED

For years Belizeans have heard complaints that institutions react only after controversies become crises.

Ella Waight's earlier observation deserves remembering:

Belize should not always wait until a decision is almost completed before citizens intervene.

That may ultimately become the most important lesson of BTL–Speednet.

The unions appear to have recognized something about their own role.
Representation cannot begin only when workers are already threatened.
Civil society cannot begin scrutinizing public decisions only when contracts are ready for signature.
The media cannot investigate only after money has been spent.
And citizens cannot exercise ownership of public institutions only on election day.

Democratic accountability works best before decisions become irreversible.

If that consciousness survives the BTL controversy, something important may indeed have awakened.

BUT AWAKENING BRINGS RESPONSIBILITY

The unions demanded evidence from BTL.

Now Belize should demand evidence from the unions.

They demanded transparency.

Their own reform proposals should therefore be transparent.

They demanded consultation.

Their proposals should themselves be consulted upon.

They demanded accountability.

Their representatives occupying public boards must also be accountable.

They defended competition.

Their procurement proposals must therefore withstand competition-policy scrutiny.

They challenged concentrated power.

Their reforms should not merely transfer concentrated power from Government into different hands.

This is not opposition to organized labour.

It is respect for the principle the unions themselves have invoked:

NO INSTITUTION SHOULD BE ABOVE SCRUTINY.

Not Government.
Not BTL.
Not the PUC.
Not business.
Not the churches.
Not NGOs.
Not the Opposition
And not the unions.

FROM PROTEST MOVEMENT TO REFORM MOVEMENT

This is the opportunity now confronting organized labour.

BTL–Speednet gave the unions momentum.
Cabinet's reversal gave them evidence that organized civic pressure can influence national decisions.

But political momentum is temporary.

Institutional reform can last generations.

If the unions use the next 90 days merely to demand resignations, Belize may replace several individuals.
If they use those 90 days to produce carefully drafted, constitutionally sound and practically workable reforms, Belize could change institutions.

That distinction is enormous.

PEOPLE CHANGE.
SYSTEMS REMAIN.
And badly designed systems eventually reproduce the same problems with different names sitting behind the desks.

THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The BTL–Speednet acquisition may have awakened something Belize has needed for some time:

AN EXPECTATION THAT PUBLIC POWER MUST EXPLAIN ITSELF.

That expectation should be encouraged.

But it must also mature.

The objective cannot become permanent confrontation between Government and organized labour.
Nor should every disagreement become a demand for someone's resignation.

The greater objective should be building institutions in which transparency, consultation and accountability happen routinely—

WITHOUT REQUIRING A NATIONAL CRISIS FIRST.