CONTROL THE IMPORT, OR CONTROL THE IMPORTER?

osilva

5

min read

A- A+

Read

Wed, 09/30/2026 - 07:46

Posted in:

Consumer

0 comments

The argument is farmer protection. The unanswered question is why Belizeans must pay this price for it.

WHEN THE MARKETING BOARD BECOMES THE MARKET — PART II

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE BELIZE | INVESTIGATIVE FEATURE

Belize City: Wednesday 30th September 2026: There is no serious argument against Belize protecting its farmers.

When Belizean potatoes, onions, carrots and other produce are entering harvest, Government has every reason to regulate competing imports. A country that cannot protect domestic food production when necessary, will eventually surrender its food security to somebody else's farms.

But that is not the controversy now confronting the Belize Marketing and Development Corporation.

The question is much simpler:

Does controlling agricultural imports require controlling the importer—and, if so, why must Belizean consumers pay substantially more under that arrangement?

That distinction became impossible to ignore after BMDC Senior Project Officer Sergio Tillett defended the existing system by asking:

“If you leave it to ten different importers, how can they control what comes into the country?”

It sounds persuasive—until the question is examined.

Because Government already controls the permits.

BMDC Administrator Valentin Carillo himself says the decision over who receives permits rests with the Ministry of Agriculture. BMDC, according to Carillo, acts as the importing agent.

So, if Government can determine who receives a permit, Government can determine how much that permit authorizes.

If Belize requires 100,000 pounds of imported potatoes before domestic production comes onto the market, Government does not have to authorize unlimited imports merely because several importers participate.
It can authorize 100,000 pounds.
It can divide that allocation among qualified importers.
It can establish an import window.
It can impose phytosanitary and quality requirements.

And when Belizean farmers are ready to supply the market, it can close the window.

Ten importers do not have to mean ten uncontrolled import streams.
That is why Tillett's explanation does not settle the controversy.

It explains why imports should be regulated.
It does not explain why BMDC must effectively centralize the importation and sale of those commodities.

And that brings National Perspective back to the question that matters most to the household buying dinner tonight:

WHAT IS THE REAL COST OF THE POTATO?

The numbers being placed into the public domain demand explanation.

Wholesaler and importer Lester Lemus says a sack of potatoes costing approximately BZD $94–$95 in Chetumal could, in his estimation, be landed in Belize for approximately $130–$135 while still allowing a profit.

He has publicly challenged a system under which BMDC was reportedly selling potatoes at approximately $195 per sack.
Lemus has gone further, explicitly alleging that consumers are being taken advantage of and describing the pricing as “price gouging.”

That is his allegation—not yet an established finding of fact.

But it is an allegation sufficiently serious, and sufficiently measurable, that Government should be able to answer it with something better than competing statements.

Show Belize the numbers.

Carillo has said BMDC's average markup on imported vegetables is approximately 16 percent, although it varies by commodity. He specifically indicated approximately 20 percent for potatoes, while margins on onions had been lowered because their prices were already high.

That creates an obvious accounting question.

If a competing importer says potatoes can be landed profitably at approximately $130–$135 per sack, while BMDC's selling price had been around $195, then BMDC should disclose the cost structure that produces its price.

Perhaps there is a perfectly legitimate explanation.

If there is, publish it.

FOLLOW THE SACK

National Perspective Belize believes the argument can be resolved with one representative shipment.

Show:

Supplier purchase price → transportation inside Mexico → packaging → service-provider fee → freight to Belize → border charges and duties → handling → BMDC overhead → BMDC markup → wholesale selling price.
Not percentages alone.
Dollar amounts.

Belizeans do not purchase potatoes in percentages.

They purchase them in dollars.

And those dollars ultimately come from household income.

This becomes even more important because there is now identified another layer in the importation chain.

Carillo confirmed that Julio Castillo provides logistics-related services associated with BMDC's imports, including consolidation, packaging and overseeing movement from areas including Mexico City and Puebla. Carillo said Castillo was already performing that function when he became administrator and that BMDC pays him a service fee. Carillo also said the Ministry of Agriculture had selected the service provider.

Again, National Perspective makes no allegation of wrongdoing against Castillo.

The question is institutional and financial:

How much is the service fee?
How is it calculated?
Per sack?
Per shipment?
By value?
By weight?
Was the service competitively tendered?
What alternatives were considered?

And, most importantly:

How much does that service add to the price eventually paid by the Belizean consumer?

Those are ordinary accountability questions involving a public statutory body and an essential component of the national food supply.

THE MARKETING BOARD'S IDENTITY PROBLEM

This brings us back to the historical problem raised in Part I.

The traditional purpose of a marketing board was fundamentally developmental: help farmers reach markets, stabilize agricultural supply and support national food production.

Today's BMDC says it must also operate as a financially self-sustaining business.

Carillo told the media that BMDC has undergone audits and estimated its profit at roughly one million dollars, although he said detailed profitability figures could not be publicly presented by him because that authority rested above his level.

There is nothing inherently improper about a statutory corporation avoiding losses.

But there is an enormous difference between:

financial sustainability

and

maximizing returns from consumers who have little practical alternative source.

That distinction matters enormously when we are talking about food.

If BMDC is the principal authorized importer of particular vegetables; if wholesalers say they cannot obtain permits to import those commodities themselves; and if retailers must therefore purchase through BMDC, then ordinary competitive pressure has been substantially restricted.

Under those circumstances, transparency cannot be optional.

It becomes essential.

THE CONTRADICTION

There is another revealing element in BMDC's explanation.

Carillo says competition is good and that BMDC effectively competes with the informal—or contraband—market.

Think carefully about what that means.

If legal competitors cannot readily obtain permits while BMDC recognizes illegal or informal importation as competitive pressure on its prices, Belize has created a peculiar market structure:

Legal competition is restricted, while illegal competition creates pressure by keeping prices in check.

That should concern policymakers.

The answer to contraband cannot be to preserve prices sufficiently attractive that smuggling becomes commercially tempting.

The better question is whether a properly regulated, licensed and competitive import system could simultaneously:

protect Belizean farmers,
control national import volumes,
maintain phytosanitary standards,
generate revenue for BMDC's developmental responsibilities,
and reduce the price reaching Belizean families.

Lemus has proposed something resembling that model: permit several importers to compete on price and quality while paying BMDC a fee on authorized imports, thereby preserving a revenue stream for the corporation without requiring BMDC to assume every logistical and commercial function itself.

Whether that particular proposal is the right model requires analysis.
But it deserves an answer.

PROTECTING FARMERS CANNOT BECOME THE END OF THE CONVERSATION

Belize must be careful here.

This debate should never be reduced to farmers versus consumers.

They are often the same families’.

A Belizean farmer deserves protection against imports flooding the country precisely when his crop is ready.

A Belizean mother in Belize City, Orange Walk, Dangriga, Punta Gorda, Belmopan or San Ignacio also deserves protection against unnecessarily inflated food prices.

Good agricultural policy must accomplish both.

And that is precisely why the current explanation deserves deeper examination.

Government can control what enters Belize.
Government can control how much enters Belize.
Government can control when it enters Belize.
Government can determine quality standards.
Government can suspend permits when domestic production becomes available.

None of those powers automatically proves that Government must also decide that one entity should dominate the commercial import channel.

That case still has to be made.

SO, OPEN THE BOOKS

National Perspective Belize is therefore not asking BMDC to defend itself with another press conference or, a Release.

We are asking for something much simpler.

Take one recent shipment of potatoes.

Publish the invoice.
Publish the quantity.
Publish the Mexican supplier price.
Publish the transportation cost.
Publish the service-provider fee.
Publish duties and border costs.
Publish BMDC's direct overhead allocation.
Publish the markup.

Then show Belize how that sack arrived at its final BMDC selling price.

Do the same with onions.

If the figures demonstrate that BMDC's prices are justified by legitimate costs, the public will be able to see that.
If they do not, Belize will have identified where the problem lies.

Either outcome serves the public interest.

Because this debate has moved beyond whether Belize should protect its farmers.

Of course it should.

The question now is whether a system designed in the name of protecting farmers has also created a protected marketplace in which the consumer has too little choice and too little visibility into the price.

And Sergio Tillett's question deserves an answer of its own:

*** “If you leave it to ten different importers, how can they control what comes into the country?”

National Perspective's Belize response is equally simple:

Control the permit.
Control the quota.
Control the quality.
Control the import window.
Protect the Belizean farmer.

But if Government also intends to control the importer, then show Belizeans why—and show them exactly what that control is costing at the market counter.