The Cooperation Framework, the Governance Promises, and the UNCAC Gap

By; Omar Silva I Editor/Publisher

National Perspective Belize I Digital 2025

www.nationalperspectivebz.com

Belize City: Thursday 14th August 2025

The architecture: how the UN is set up in Belize

Belize is covered by the UN Multi-Country Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (MSDCF) 2022–2026 for the English- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean—the top legal/strategic instrument that guides all UN development work here. It sets four pillars: (1) economic resilience and shared prosperity; (2) equality and well-being; (3) climate resilience and sustainable natural resource management; (4) peace, safety, justice and the rule of law. Country-level delivery is aligned to those pillars.

Under the MSDCF, Belize and the UN agree each year on a Country Implementation Plan (CIP)—essentially a joint workplan validated by the GOB—overseen by a Joint National Steering Committee (JNSC) co-convened by Government and the UN. The Belize CIP 2024–2025 confirms that alignment to the country’s Medium-Term Development Strategy (MTDS 2022–2026) and explicitly puts governance and anti-corruption capacity on the table.

Day-to-day, the system is led by the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), Raúl Salazar, the UN’s highest-ranking development official in-country who coordinates agencies and heads the UN Country Team. His mandate and limits are defined by the UN RC Generic Job Description and the Management & Accountability Framework (MAF): the RC leads and convenes; line agencies implement; Government owns the results. The RC is not an enforcement authority.

UNDP’s Deputy Resident Representative, Michael Lund, runs UNDP’s programme delivery in Belize (appointed Sept 9, 2024), focusing on governance, digital public services, inclusive growth and justice sector support, among others.

What the UN provides to Belize (in practice)

1) A binding framework and joint plan:

• The MSDCF is the contract-level framework; the CIP 2024–2025 itemizes Belize’s UN-supported outputs, financing needs and gaps, and names the JNSC as the strategic governor of implementation.

2) Evidence and diagnostics for policy:

• The Common Country Analysis (CCA)—updated periodically—flags Belize’s structural risks and SDG bottlenecks and feeds every revision of UN support.

3) Governance and justice support projects:

• UNDP/UN partners deliver concrete governance assistance (e.g., case-management and ICT for the courts; digital public services like the transit app; integrity and public administration capacity-building).

4) Convening power & resource mobilization:

• The RCO (RC’s Office) leads a partnership/resource mobilization strategy to bring donors and Government around a single results frame.

5) System leadership—not police powers:

• Per UN rules, the RC coordinates and advocates across agencies and with Government; enforcement of anti-corruption obligations sits with the State, not the RC.

What Belize commits to under this governance setup

1) Align national plans with the MSDCF and CIP.

The CIP states it is validated by the Government of Belize to ensure it reflects MTDS 2022–2026 priorities, and it is adjustable via JNSC decisions as needs change.

2) Provide political leadership and data.

Government co-chairs the steering, supplies data to UNINFO reporting, and clears the joint outputs each year

3) Advance “peace, safety, justice & rule of law.”

That pillar explicitly covers accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption institutions—Government undertakes to move reforms inside that pillar, with UN technical help.

4) Maintain an enabling environment for oversight.

The CCA and CIP both flag public concerns over corruption and call for stronger citizen engagement, transparency, and accountability mechanisms.

UNCAC in Belize: the promise vs. the delivery

Status & obligations. Belize acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 12 December 2016, triggering obligations on prevention (asset declarations, public procurement, integrity systems), criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery. Belize underwent a UNODC Implementation Review with a country report published in 2020.

What’s been supported. UNDP and partners backed self-assessment and implementation planning after accession to sequence reforms—an aid-to-deliver document exists for Belize.

Where the gap remains.

• The CIP 2024–2025 itself notes public outcry about corruption, the perception of shrinking transparency spaces, and the need to strengthen systems—despite a stated move to establish an anti-corruption commission. In other words: intent recognized, delivery uneven.
• Belize’s UNCAC review identified areas to align domestic law and practice with the Convention; sustained legislative action, enforcement capacity, asset declaration regimes, whistle-blower protection, and procurement controls are the usual lag points across the region. (This is a generalized inference contextualized by the 2020 review record and UNDP implementation planning).

Why hasn’t the UN “demanded” UNCAC compliance?

Short answer: because that is not how the RC mandate works. The UN development system is country-owned and demand-driven. The RC leads, coordinates, and advocates within the MAF and RC job description; UNODC runs the State-party review mechanism; only the State can legislate and enforce. The UN can press, advise, publish diagnostics, convene donors and civil society, and tie financing to reform milestones—but it cannot compel compliance. That constraint is by design.

That said, there are levers:

• Programming conditionalities & milestones in governance projects (e.g., justice sector digitalization tied to SOPs, publication standards).
• Public reporting via CCA updates, Country Results Reports, and the CIP’s funding gap/outputs matrix—each creates pressure by documenting progress and stalls.
• Peer review pressure under the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism and civil society shadow reporting.

So, what should Belizeans look for—tangible benchmarks for 2025–2026

1. A live, staffed Anti-Corruption Commission with powers. The CIP already frames governance gaps; the next test is whether the commission has budget, independence, case intake, and public reporting.
2. Legislative follow-through: modern asset declarations, conflict-of-interest rules, whistle-blower protection, open contracting/procurement transparency, and beneficial ownership disclosure aligned to UNCAC. (Benchmarked from UNCAC obligations and Belize’s 2020 review).
3. Justice system performance data: case-backlog reduction, e-filing uptime, publication of judgments—UNDP and EU-supported ICT upgrades should translate into measurable throughput.
4. Public budget transparency: timely publication of budgets, supplementary appropriations, and procurement awards in open data formats—with citizen feedback loops reflected in the CIP/JNSC minutes.

Bottom line

• What the UN provides: a legally grounded cooperation framework (MSDCF), an annual, co-validated plan (CIP), diagnostics (CCA), convening power, and project financing/expertise—including governance and justice support.
• What GOB owes: to steer and deliver under the JNSC/CIP, legislate and enforce UNCAC reforms, and open the governance space so results are public and verifiable.
• Why UNCAC lags: because ultimate authority lies with the State; the UN cannot force compliance. The RC and UNDP can—and should—keep using the CCA/CIP, project conditions, and public reporting to ratchet up accountability.