THE BRICEÑO BORROWING LEDGER 2020–2026: WHAT BELIZE BORROWED — AND WHAT BELIZE ACTUALLY BUILT

THE BORROWING STATE — PART II

The question is no longer whether Belize borrows. Every government borrows. The question is what six years of borrowing have left behind.

In Part I we posed a deliberately uncomfortable question:

Belize City: Sunday 23rd August 2026: 

WHY DOES SO MUCH OF GOVERNMENT'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA ARRIVE WITH A LOAN ATTACHED TO IT?

Now we move beyond the question.

We open the ledger.

And before entering a single figure, we must establish one rule of fairness:

Not every loan is bad debt.

Some of the borrowing undertaken since the Briceño administration took office in November 2020 has financed—or is intended to finance—real infrastructure, productive activity, disaster protection, agricultural investment, schools, electricity infrastructure and water systems.

• Some has financed government systems, consultants, institutional reform, digitization, administrative capacity and public-sector management.
• Some has been emergency borrowing.
• Some represents loans approved but not yet completely disbursed.
• Some facilities are concessional enough that refusing them could itself be economically foolish.

Therefore, National Perspective Belize will not place every dollar into one politically convenient basket.

Instead, we ask one question of every facility:

WHAT DID BELIZE BORROW — AND WHAT DID BELIZE GET?

FIRST: THE SCALE

The Government itself provides an important reference point.

In its 2024 Budget Speech, the Briceño administration reported that during 2023 alone Belize received approximately:

• BZ$95 million in loan inflows from traditional multilateral institutions including the IDB, CDB and World Bank;
• BZ$86 million in loans and grants from Taiwan;
• approximately BZ$4 million from the Kuwait Fund.

That is not evidence of wrongdoing.

It is evidence of something else:

EXTERNAL FINANCING HAS BECOME A CENTRAL INSTRUMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DEVELOPMENT MODEL.

And when we trace individual facilities approved during the administration, the scale becomes even clearer.

The projects below do not constitute every cent borrowed by Belize between November 2020 and August 2026. Nor should approved amounts automatically be confused with amounts already disbursed.

But they establish beyond reasonable dispute that external credit has been woven deeply into the machinery of national development.

1. US$15 MILLION — KEEPING BUSINESSES ALIVE

• Lender: Inter-American Development Bank
• Project: Global Credit Program for Safeguarding Productive Sectors and Employment

Approved: August 2021

This was pandemic-era borrowing.

The IDB approved US$15 million to support Belizean micro, small and medium-sized businesses through financing provided through the Development Finance Corporation.

Its stated purpose was to preserve businesses, employment and economic activity during the COVID-19 shock.

The operation is now listed by the IDB as closed.

• What was Belize supposed to get?
• Credit flowing into productive businesses.
• This is not the same as borrowing US$15 million to run a ministry.

If businesses survived, jobs were maintained and loans were repaid into the DFC system, the country potentially received a continuing productive benefit.

THE LEDGER QUESTION:

1. How many businesses received financing?
2. How many jobs were demonstrably preserved?
3. What is the repayment performance of the underlying loans?
4. And how much of that capital remains within Belize's development-finance system today?

Verdict: Potentially productive borrowing — but the outcome should be quantified.

2. US$8 MILLION — TEACHING GOVERNMENT TO MANAGE ITS MONEY

Lender: IDB

Project: Strengthening Public Expenditure Management

• Approved: September 2021
• Signed: May 2022
• The Government borrowed US$8 million to strengthen fiscal sustainability and modernize public financial management.

The programme includes improved debt management, budgeting, internal auditing, procurement, transparency systems, data analytics and expansion of Ministry of Finance information infrastructure.

As of August 2026, the IDB still lists the project as under implementation.

This project therefore becomes particularly important to our investigation.

• Because five years after approval, Belizeans should be able to identify concrete institutional changes.

WHAT DID WE BUILD?

1. Not a highway.
2. Not a factory.
3. Not a generating plant.
4. We purchased State capacity.

Therefore the return must be measured differently:

• Did procurement become cheaper?
• Did financial reporting improve?
• Has the promised transparency architecture become publicly useful?
• Has government reduced leakage or waste?
• Can taxpayers identify measurable savings generated by this US$8 million investment?

Verdict: Institutional borrowing. The promised asset is efficiency itself—therefore efficiency must be measured.

3. US$25 MILLION — CLIMATE-RESILIENT AGRICULTURE

Lender: World Bank

Approved: March 2022

The World Bank approved US$25 million for the Climate Resilient and Sustainable Agriculture Project.

Unlike an administrative reform programme, its productive logic is readily identifiable.

The project was designed to reach more than 7,000 farmers, provide grants to over 3,700 small farmers, improve access to weather and technical information and leverage private investment in climate-smart agricultural technology.

THIS IS THE KIND OF LOAN THAT MUST BE JUDGED BY PRODUCTION.

1. How many acres became more productive?
2. How much additional food was produced?
3. How much agricultural import substitution occurred?
4. How much additional export revenue resulted?
5. How many irrigation systems, greenhouses or productive assets remain on farms?

Because if agricultural borrowing produces greater agricultural output for decades, the country possesses an asset capable of helping repay the debt.

Verdict: Productive-development borrowing. The test is agricultural output and farmer income.

4. US$24 MILLION — PHILIP GOLDSON HIGHWAY

Lender: Central American Bank for Economic Integration — CABEI

Approved: April 2022

CABEI approved US$24 million to widen and rehabilitate approximately 25.75 kilometres of the Philip Goldson Highway.

The loan carries a 20-year term, a three-year grace period and, at approval, an indicative annual interest rate of 3.85%.

CABEI projected benefits to approximately 39,000 road users, rising to 63,800 by 2039, and estimated annual road-maintenance savings of nearly US$696,000.

Here there can be little argument over the existence of a physical asset.

A reconstructed highway remains after the consultant leaves.

But there is another issue.

CABEI records show that the operation subsequently encountered extensions and continued through various stages of formalization and disbursement.

So our measurement becomes:

• How much has actually been completed?
• At what final cost?
• On what timetable?
• And does the completed asset correspond with what Belize borrowed to construct?

Verdict: Tangible infrastructure borrowing. Judge it by delivery, cost and durability.

5. US$15 MILLION — SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND TOURISM

Lender: IDB

Approved: September 2022

• Another US$15 million was approved under the Sustainable and Inclusive Belize programme.

It targets farmers and tourism MSMEs, with technical assistance, business plans, equipment, climate-resilient technologies and improved market access.

• The programme remains in implementation as of August 2026.

Again, there is a potentially productive rationale.

But four years after approval, the question is becoming measurable:

1. Where are the businesses?
2. Where are the farms?
3. What technologies were installed?
4. What additional income was generated?
5. What exports increased?

Verdict: Potentially productive. Increasingly ripe for an outcomes audit.

6. US$8 MILLION — TRADE AND INVESTMENT FACILITATION

Lender: IDB

Approved: September 2022

Belize borrowed another US$8 million to improve foreign investment and trade performance.

The programme promises automated and simplified investment procedures, improved investment promotion and support for Belizean SMEs entering international markets.

• The IDB still lists the programme as under implementation in August 2026.
• This project gives us an especially important economic test.
• Government repeatedly promotes investment summits and foreign-investment initiatives.

Here Belize has borrowed money specifically to improve investment attraction.

Therefore:

WHERE IS THE RETURN?

• How much new FDI can be credibly linked to the programme?
• How many export-ready Belizean businesses entered foreign markets?
• How dramatically have approval times fallen?
• How many procedures were actually eliminated?

This loan should eventually be judged in dollars of investment and exports, not PowerPoint presentations.

Verdict: Economic-capacity borrowing whose return must become measurable.

7. US$15 MILLION LOAN + US$5 MILLION GRANT — SKILLS FOR THE FUTURE

Lenders: IDB and Global Partnership for Education

Belize received a financing package combining an US$15 million IDB loan with a US$5 million grant for the Skills for the Future Programme.

We deliberately separate those numbers.

The grant is not debt.

The US$15 million is.

The programme targets foundational learning, technology-related skills and preparation of Belize's future workforce.

Education is an investment whose return occurs over decades.

But even here there must be accountability:

1. Did student achievement improve?
2. Did dropout rates decline?
3. Did technical skills improve?
4. Are employers finding better-qualified Belizean workers?

Verdict: Human-capital borrowing. Legitimate in principle; results must be educational, not ceremonial.

8. US$7 MILLION — BLUE ECONOMY

Lender: IDB

Signed: November 2023

Another US$7 million sovereign-guaranteed loan was contracted to develop Belize's blue economy.

Its objectives include increasing artisanal-fisher earning potential, sustaining fisheries exports, improving fisheries management and supporting climate-resilient technologies.

The project remains under implementation.

Again:

• How much did fisher income increase?
• How much did fisheries productivity improve?
• What equipment was delivered?
• Did exports increase?
• Did stocks become more sustainably managed?

Verdict: Potentially productive borrowing. Still awaiting a complete return.

9. US$10 MILLION — DIGITAL GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS

Lender: IDB

Belize borrowed US$10 million for digital innovation.

The programme includes digitizing government services, civil-registration procedures and services affecting businesses; training approximately 300 businesses and 160 public officers; and providing digital adoption vouchers to around 200 businesses.

The loan has a 25-year maturity and a 5½-year grace period.

That means Belize could still be repaying this digital-transformation project long after today's computer systems themselves have become obsolete.

That does not automatically make the loan foolish.

But it raises the standard for return.

If a 25-year debt finances technology, the efficiency savings must materially outlive the technology cycle.

Verdict: Institutional/economic modernization borrowing. Benefits must exceed the long repayment horizon.

10. US$10 MILLION — NORTHERN MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT

Lender: IDB

Approved: May 2024

The Sustainable and Inclusive Urban Development Programme carries another US$10 million sovereign-guaranteed loan.

Its objectives include improved urban services, local economic growth and integration of vulnerable populations in northern Belize.

As of August 2026 it remains under implementation.

• This belongs closer to the infrastructure side of our ledger.
• If streets, drainage, markets and municipal infrastructure emerge, those are identifiable public assets.

Verdict: Infrastructure/community borrowing. Judge by completed works and local economic impact.

11. THE ENERGY PACKAGE — APPROXIMATELY US$58.4 MILLION

World Bank + Canadian Climate Facility

This is one of the largest individual programmes in the ledger.

The energy initiative launched in 2025 carries approximately US$58.4 million in financing, including a US$50 million World Bank loan and approximately US$8.2 million from Canada's Clean Energy and Forests Climate Facility, plus a small grant.

• It is designed to install battery energy-storage systems, strengthen transmission infrastructure and increase renewable-energy integration.

World Bank procurement documents identify major battery-storage packages for Dangriga, San Pedro, Orange Walk and the Belize District, with procurement and implementation extending through 2026–2028.

This is therefore one of the strongest examples of potentially strategic borrowing.

• Belize imports roughly half its electricity, according to the World Bank, while demand has expanded sharply and little generating capacity was added for years.
• If these investments reduce outages, reduce expensive imported electricity and enable domestic renewable generation, they can produce a genuine national return.

But again:

WE MUST MEASURE IT.

1. How much imported electricity was displaced?
2. How much did the cost of power decline?
3. How many outage-hours disappeared?
4. What happened to consumers' bills?

Verdict: Strategic infrastructure borrowing—potentially among the strongest cases in the portfolio if the promised energy savings materialize.

12. US$23.5 MILLION — BLUE CITIES AND COASTAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In January 2025 the World Bank approved a broader US$32.23 million blue-economy initiative, incorporating financing for coastal and urban improvements.

• Its tangible components include expansion of water supply in South San Pedro and upgrades to Belize City's wastewater-treatment infrastructure, together with waste-management and coastal initiatives.
• Parliamentary documents subsequently identify a US$23.5 million IDA loan for the Belize Blue Cities and Beyond Project.
• These are real infrastructure objectives.

The audit question becomes whether Belize eventually receives the promised water, wastewater and urban assets at the expected cost.

Verdict: Primarily infrastructure/environmental borrowing.

13. US$20 MILLION — MONEY RESERVED FOR THE NEXT DISASTER

World Bank Cat-DDO

Approved: July 2025

This one needs to be treated differently.

• Belize secured US$20 million under a catastrophe deferred-drawdown facility.
• It is essentially contingent financing that becomes rapidly available following an eligible disaster or health emergency.
• It should not be criticized as though Government borrowed US$20 million to hold a conference.

Belize is extraordinarily vulnerable to hurricanes and climate shocks.

The economic question is therefore whether pre-arranged contingent financing is cheaper and less disruptive than desperately seeking money after catastrophe strikes.

Quite possibly it is.

Verdict: Financial insurance/resilience borrowing. A separate category entirely.

14. US$23.5 MILLION — EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT

World Bank IDA

Approved: April 2026

The World Bank approved US$23.5 million in concessional IDA credit, accompanied by a US$1.28 million grant, for early-childhood development and female economic participation.

• The programme promises 60 new preschool classrooms, rehabilitation or upgrading of another 30 preschools, and approximately 80 early-development centres.

These are measurable assets.

• And importantly, Belize's access to IDA financing significantly alters the economics of borrowing because IDA credit carries much softer terms than conventional market debt.

The Government itself celebrated Belize's access to IDA in 2024, describing the available terms as up to a 40-year repayment period, ten-year grace period and a 0.75% annual service charge.

That matters.

Cheap long-term capital used for durable social infrastructure can be rational borrowing.

Verdict: Concessional human-capital/infrastructure borrowing. Stronger economic case than ordinary commercial debt.

15. US$7 MILLION — EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR-FORCE PARTICIPATION

• Another IDB programme worth US$7 million was signed in February 2026 to improve labour-force participation and employability.

It remains under implementation.

Again, the result cannot eventually be:

“Training was delivered.”

The result must become:

1. How many people obtained jobs?
2. How much did their earnings increase?
3. How many remained employed?

Verdict: Human-capital borrowing requiring measurable employment outcomes.

16. AND FINALLY — THE US$8 MILLION LOAN THAT STARTED THIS INVESTIGATION

Support to Civil Service Modernization

IDB

Approved June 26, 2026

Total programme cost: US$9 million

Belize counterpart: US$1 million

The Government is borrowing another US$8 million specifically to improve the efficiency of the central-government wage bill and strategic management of public employment.

This is where the ledger becomes especially revealing.

Five years earlier:

• US$8 million — Strengthening Public Expenditure Management.

Now:

• US$8 million — Civil Service Modernization.

That is US$16 million in two IDB loans alone devoted substantially to improving how Government manages itself.

The second programme may be justified.

But it produces perhaps the cleanest accountability test in this entire investigation.

IF WE BORROW US$8 MILLION TO REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT, THEN SHOW BELIZE THE SAVINGS.

• Not activities.

Savings.

• Not consultants.

Savings.

• Not workshops.

Savings.

• Not software.

Savings.

Because the programme's own objective is wage-bill efficiency.

Therefore, taxpayers should eventually be entitled to a number:

• HOW MANY DOLLARS DID THIS US$8 MILLION LOAN SAVE BELIZE?

THE PRESSURE-TESTED VERDICT

And now we reach an important conclusion.

Our original hypothesis survives examination—but in a more sophisticated form.

It would be unfair to say:

“The Briceño Government borrows because it cannot do anything without borrowing.”

The evidence does not justify such an absolute statement.

1. Several loans finance clearly identifiable infrastructure and productive assets.
2. Some are highly concessional.
3. Some address extraordinary pandemic or disaster conditions.
4. Some support businesses.
5. Some finance agriculture.
6. Some build energy infrastructure.
7. Some produce classrooms, water systems, roads and wastewater facilities.

Those distinctions matter.

But another proposition does survive the pressure test:

THE BRICEÑO ADMINISTRATION HAS EMBEDDED EXTERNAL BORROWING DEEPLY INTO BELIZE'S DEVELOPMENT MODEL.

And the portfolio extends beyond traditional roads, bridges and physical infrastructure.

Belize has borrowed to:

1. manage public expenditure;
2. modernize Government;
3. digitize Government;
4. facilitate investment;
5. develop businesses;
6. develop agriculture;
7. develop tourism;
8. develop fisheries;
9. develop skills;
10. increase employability;
11. modernize the Civil Service;
12. strengthen energy;
13. improve municipal development;
14. and prepare financially for disasters.

That breadth is the story.

AND HERE IS THE QUESTION GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER

If all this external capital represents wise investment, Government should have no difficulty producing a single public document showing:

• LOAN
• AMOUNT
• INTEREST RATE
• TERM
• AMOUNT DISBURSED
• AMOUNT SPENT
• PHYSICAL OUTPUT
• ECONOMIC/SOCIAL OUTCOME
• EXPECTED RETURN
• CURRENT REPAYMENT OBLIGATION

Call it:

THE NATIONAL BORROWING SCORECARD.

Publish it every year.

Let every Belizean see what the country owes—and what the country received.

• Because announcing that an international bank has approved another US$20 million tells us only that Belize has access to financing.

It tells us nothing about development until the money produces results.

THE MOST IMPORTANT DISCOVERY OF THIS LEDGER

Perhaps the real divide is no longer:

BORROW OR DON'T BORROW.

It is:

BORROW TO BUILD — OR BORROW TO KEEP BUILDING GOVERNMENT.

When debt creates a road, reservoir, classroom, electrical system, productive farm, export industry or water network, the next generation inherits both the liability and an asset.

• When debt purchases administrative reform, institutional capacity or digital modernization, the physical inheritance is less obvious.

That does not make such spending worthless.

• It makes accountability even more important.

Because the asset we are purchasing is supposed to be a better-functioning State.

And if the State requires another modernization loan five years later, taxpayers are entitled to ask what happened to the last modernization loan.

WHAT DID BELIZE BORROW?

From the facilities examined here alone, we are already dealing with hundreds of millions of US dollars in approved or contracted external financing during the Briceño years.

1. Not all has been disbursed.
2. Not all is direct Central Government debt.
3. Not all carries equal terms.
4. Not all deserves equal criticism.

That is precisely why this ledger matters.

• Because political slogans obscure what accounting reveals.

WHAT DID BELIZE BUILD?

Some answers already exist:

• Farm investments.
• A highway programme.
• Energy-storage infrastructure now moving through procurement and implementation.
• Schools and educational programmes.
• Water and wastewater infrastructure moving toward construction.
• Business credit.
• Government information systems.
• Trade systems.
• Fisheries programmes.
• Public-finance reforms.
• And much more remains under implementation.

Which means the final verdict cannot yet be written.

• But neither should the debt be forgotten while Belize waits for the development.

THE BORROWING STATE MUST NOW BECOME THE ACCOUNTABLE STATE

Government frequently tells Belize when another lender approves another facility.

Good.

Then Government should show Belize, with equal enthusiasm:

WHAT THE LAST LOAN ACCOMPLISHED.

Because development finance should never become a revolving national ceremony:

1. Sign.
2. Photograph.
3. Press release.
4. Launch.
5. Borrow again.

The cycle must eventually arrive at one final stage:

RESULT.

And that is where National Perspective Belize will keep its eyes.

Not merely on the amount Belize can borrow.

But on the country Belize has to show for it.

1. THE BRICEÑO BORROWING LEDGER REMAINS OPEN.
2. THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER ONLY: HOW MUCH DO WE OWE?

3. THE QUESTION IS: WHAT DO WE OWN BECAUSE WE OWE IT

   By: Omar Silva: Editorial Director @ www.nationalperspectivebz.com